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1 Introduction
What makes bank loans special? The literature emphasizes the bank’s ability to renegotiate
the terms of existing loans (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Gorton and Kahn, 2000).
Empirically, Roberts (2010) reports that most bank loans are renegotiated multiple times
over relatively short time horizons, leading to significant changes in the loan terms.1 We can
consider each change of the contract terms as prepaying the original loan and refinancing
it through a new one. That is, prepayments of bank loans are widely observed. However,
unlike most bonds, which have long no-call periods and high call premiums, most loans are
prepayable at any time typically without prepayment fees (Standard&Poor’s, 2009).2 Why
are bank lenders, in contrast to bondholders, willing to accept prepayments without penalty
or, in other words, how are bank lenders compensated for the prepayment risk?
In this paper, we answer this question by linking penalty-free prepayments with credit ra-
tioning. We show that non-interest terms is necessary to maintain the borrowers’ flexibility
to prepay bank loans freely. If voluntary prepayments are penalty-free as widely observed
in practice, over time good borrowers prepay their loans while bad borrowers stay. This
reclassification effect leaves the lender with bad borrowers only. Increasing the interest rate
is not sufficient to compensate for the prepayment risk, so the lender resorts to non-interest
credit rationing, for example, using collateral or the upfront fee.3 The model predicts that
higher upfront fees are associated with higher loan price and/or lower refinancing costs, and
that secured loans and/or performance-sensitive loans use higher upfront fees. We provide
supportive evidence concerning these predictions through a sample of term loans to U.S.
1In his sample, ignoring the few short-term loans that are not renegotiated, the typical loan is renegotiated
four times, despite having a stated maturity of less than five years.
2Amir Sufi on his website, http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.htm, provides 3,720
loan contracts, of which none specifies a penalty for voluntary prepayments. It is very common that the
following term is included in a loan contract: “the borrower may prepay any base rate borrowing in whole
at any time, or from time to time in part, without premium or penalty”.
3A frequently used term in the literature is non-price credit rationing, where price refers to the interest
rate. Since the upfront fee is thought of as a part of the loan price, in this paper we instead use the term,
non-interest credit rationing, describing the situation in which the bank uses instruments other than the
interest rate to ration credit.
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firms.
In our model, the borrower signs a loan contract with the lender to finance an investment
project. Shortly after the project is started, there arrives a non-verifiable signal concerning
the project’s future payoff. This signal may induce strategic prepayments and renegotia-
tions. If the signal is good, the project is better than ex-ante expected and the original
interest rate is not fair anymore. Thus, the borrower refinances the original loan with a
new cheaper loan. In this case, the lender is near to breakeven.4 If the signal is bad, the
project has negative NPV and the lender will lose money for sure. Conditional on a positive
probability of prepayment, the lender always loses money ex ante. Increasing the interest
rate alone is not sufficient to compensate the lender for prepayment risk because, no matter
how high the original interest rate is, the lender cannot capture the upside of the project
due to prepayment. Then the lender resorts to non-interest terms to protect herself from
the prepayment risk, for example, by asking for collateral or reducing the loan size. This
is consistent with the stylized facts in practice that, the interest spread is remarkably low,
while non-price instruments such as collateral are widely observed debt features, especially
for bank loans (v.s. corporate bonds).5
In addition to non-price instruments such as collateral, the lender can employ a non-linear
pricing approach in which the price of the loan is split into two parts: one part, the interest,
is linear in the loan amount and the other part, the upfront fee paid as a lump-sum, is non-
linear. For a given project, the probability of prepayment is increasing with the interest rate.
The upfront fee reduces the interest rate and hence mitigates the firm’s incentive to prepay
the loan early. The model as well as its extensions has several testable predictions concerning
the use of upfront fees. First, loans with higher price require higher upfront fees to reduce
4The accrued interest can be ignored when the signal arrives soon after the project is started. A high
interest before the signal is infeasible, because it may take away all the payoff of the borrower in the case of
the bad signal so that the borrower quits. More discussion is given in the model latter.
5Among more than 86,000 U.S. C&I loans in the DealScan database between 1987 and 2011, the interest
spread over LIBOR has a mean 2.53% and standard deviation 1.58%, and around 84% are secured. For over
1.1 million U.S. small business loans issued between 1977 and 1988 in the dataset from the Federal Reserve’s
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, the mean and standard deviation of the interest spread are 2.47% and
2.59% respectively, and over 70% are secured (Berger and Udell, 1992).
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the interest rate and hence the prepayment risk. Second, loans with higher refinancing costs
are less likely to be prepaid, so they are associated with lower upfront fees. Third, if the
use of the upfront fee is costly for borrowers, who are usually liquidity-constrained at the
borrowing time, and hence occurs only when collateral is exhausted, higher upfront fees are
observed in secured loans. Finally, if the signal is verifiable, performance-pricing based on
the signal mitigates prepayments and hence reduces the use of upfront fees.
To test these model implications, we construct a sample of 29,510 term loans to U.S. firms
between 1992 and 2011. The information on upfront fees and other contract terms is from
LPC DealScan. We use the loan spread as the proxy for the loan price and the dummies
of syndication and institutional term loans (ITLs) as the proxy for the level of refinancing
costs. Compared to traditional bank loans, syndication loans have multiple lenders while
ITLs are traded in the secondary market. Both have complex structures and are associated
with higher renegotiation and refinancing costs (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Brunner
and Krahnen, 2008). In our sample, around 16% of the term loans include the upfront fee
information, which is approximately 31% of the interest spread of these loans. All the others
have the upfront fee marked as “N/A”. According to the LPC customer service, when no data
was collected or provided for the upfront fee item, LPC leaves it as “N/A”. Discussions with
practical people in commercial banks suggest that most loans have an upfront fee, but it
could be confidential in practice. We thus conjecture that the “N/As” include random missing
values, zeros and self-selection hidden values. For this reason, we run three empirical models:
OLS on non-missing values, Heckman selection model on the full sample, and OLS/Logit
taking “N/As” as zeros. All the regression results are consistent with our model predictions.
The use of upfront fees is positively correlated with the loan spread. A 100 basis points
increase in the loan spread leads to an average increase in the upfront fee by over 15 basis
points. Loans with higher refinancing costs, unsecured loans and performance-sensitive loans
are in general associated with lower upfront fees.
Our paper links the two stylized facts in C&I loan markets, non-interest credit rationing
and penalty-free prepayments, and we provide a rationale for the use of upfront fees. The
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credit rationing literature resorts to agency problems for the rationales of credit rationing,
for example, adverse selection and risk shifting (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), costly state
verification (e.g., Williamson, 1987), hidden effort (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Al-
though agency problems may still be the reason for penalty-free prepayments in C&I bank
loans, we link the reclassication effect due to penalty-free prepayments with credit rationing
and add a new angle to think about such a prevalent phenomenon. We also show how
the non-interest terms such as collateral solve the rationing problem through mitigating the
prepayment risk. This is in line with Bester (1985), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), etc.
To our best knowledge, there are no extant papers studying prepayments and the use of
upfront fees in C&I loans. In practice, bank loans usually allow penalty-free prepayments
and a proportion of bank loans are associated with substantial upfront fees. However, the
motive for using upfront fees is unclear. It is typically thought that the upfront fee is used
to compensate the lender for fixed cost to originate the loan (e.g., Ivashina, 2009). If this
is the only use of the upfront fee, it should not be highly corelated with the loan spread,
after controlling for the other contract and firm characteristics. After all, the fixed costs can
also be compensated through the loan interest. We are the first to argue that the upfront
fee can be used as a substitute for penalty to mitigate prepayment risk. Unlike commercial
bank loans, most of subprime mortgage loans have prepayment penalties. Mayer, Piskorski,
and Tchistyi (forthcoming) illustrate that prepayment penalties in mortgages can be welfare-
improving because they reduce the reclassification risk and benefit risky borrowers through
extended credit availability. Their model shares the similar intuition with ours.6
There is a branch of the literature studying underwriting spread in IPOs, SEOs and bond
issues (see e.g. the survey by Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2007). The spread is the compensa-
tion paid to the underwriter for selling the firm’s security issue, as a percentage of the capital
raised. It is found that the underwriting spread is a U-shaped in the issue size (Altinkilic and
6Mortgage loans, like bonds, usually have fixed-rate, so changes of the market interest rate may be the
key reasons for prepayments though Mayer, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (forthcoming) assume fixed market rate.
This is different from C&I loans which has floating rates.
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Hansen, 2000). As the issue size is increasing, the fixed cost of the underwriter(s) exhibits
economies of scale, i.e., the average fixed cost is decreasing. At the same time, as the issue
size is increasing for the same firm, the services such as underwriter certification, monitoring
and marketing are more costly, so the underwriter spread may increase. Traditionally, the
upfront fee in bank loans is also thought as an underwriting fee, compensating the lender for
fixed costs (Ivashina, 2009). However, for bonds as well as IPOs and SEOs, the underwriter
is only an intermediary, who helps the issuer to sell the security to investors while, for bank
loans, the underwriter and the investor are the same. The underwriting spread of bonds is
completely an intermediation fee, but the upfront fee in bank loans may not. In particular,
since the lender is also the investor, she can charge the underwriter fees through increasing
the interest rate. A lump-sum upfront fee seems unnecessary if it is only an intermediation
fee. Empirically, the upfront fee in bank loans does not show economy of scale of issue size
as the underwriter spread for IPO/SEOs in Eckbo and Masulis (1992), and neither does the
U-shape in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000).
Our model shows that penalty-free prepayments induce non-interest credit rationing. This
conclusions is independent of the reasons that allow penalty-free prepayments. One ques-
tion still remains: why not a prepayment penalty but the non-interest terms? Especially,
these non-interest terms may incur some deadweight costs. For instance, there are screening,
monitoring, and repossession costs associated with collateral (Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou,
2011b), and the upfront fee raises the loan size and hence default risk. A natural question
is whether a prepayment penalty can substitute for these non-interest terms to mitigate the
prepayment risk. In practice, prepayment penalty is rarely observed for bank loans. We
propose three rationales that allow for penalty-free prepayments. First, the lender ex ante
loses money only if the borrower refinances the loan with a cheaper one, but prepayment
may occur for various reasons. For example, the arrival of new investment opportunities
may require the firm to refinance or renegotiate the loan to mitigate a debt-overhang. It is
difficult to identify the purpose of the refinancing at the time of prepayment for C&I loans
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and hence impossible to impose prepayment penalties contingent on the purpose.7 The flex-
ibility to prepay freely allows the borrower to capture valuable investment opportunities
and thus maintains her competitive advantage in product markets. Second, there might be
ex-ante hidden risk of borrowers. Intuitively, a prepayment penalty penalizes the good type
of borrowers more than the bad type because it is triggered only in good states. To mitigate
the adverse selection effect, the equilibrium contract excludes prepayment penalty. Third,
prepayment penalty causes the time-inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
When observing the good signal, the borrower has better outside options and hence more
bargaining power, and then can negotiate away the prepayment penalty. In contrast, the
upfront fee is paid in advance and hence cannot be eliminated in subsequent negotiations.
In an extreme case, if a large prepayment penalty is charged for a small business, the en-
trepreneur may walk away once he observes the good signal (Hart and Moore, 1994). For
this reason, venture capital funding usually includes a “no-compete” provision (Kaplan and
Strömberg, 2003).
In the rest of the paper, section 2 describes the model, illustrating how penalty-free pre-
payments induce non-interest credit rationing and how the use of upfront fees mitigates the
prepayment risk. Section 4 proposes testable implications of the model. Section 4 shows
empirical evidence. In section 5, we discuss potential reasons that allow for penalty-free
prepayments. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Setup
Consider the representative borrower in a competitive credit market and her lender. The
lender is a bank or other lending institution. The borrower is a firm with limited liability.
Both parties are risk-neutral and their discount rates are normalized to zero. There are three
7Prepayments for mortgages occur for two main reasons, family movements and changed market interest
rate, which are both easily detected. Prepayment penalty is thus commonly included in subprime loans,
frequently contingent on the purpose of refinance.
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dates, date 0, date 1 and an interim date t (0 < t < 1). The borrower is endowed with an
investment project that require one unit of initial investment at date 0 and will realize a
stochastic payoff at date 1.8 The payoff is either U if the project succeeds or D if it fails,
where U > 1 > D. Without loss of generality, assume that the borrower has zero initial
net worth so that the project is fully financed by a loan from the lender. The downside
payoff, D, reflects collateral of the loan. We only consider the standard debt contract with
an interest rate, r, and maturity, 1. That is, at maturity, the borrower either pays 1 + r to
the lender and keeps U − 1− r when no default occurs, or loses everything in default.
At date 0, information is symmetric, the loan contract is signed and the borrower starts the
investment. Then, at the interim date t shortly after the project is started, there arrives a
publicly observed but non-verifiable signal concerning the date-1 payoff of the project. Due
to non-verifiability, the signal is un-contractible. With probability p, the signal is good and
otherwise, the signal is bad. Conditional on the good or bad signal, the probability of success
of the project is g or b. In total, the date 1 payoff of the project is U with probability s and
D with probability 1 − s, where s = pg + (1 − p)b. The project has positive NPV ex ante
but negative NPV following the bad signal, i.e.
gU + (1− g)D > sU + (1− s)D > 1 > bU + (1− b)D.
The payoff structure of the project and the timeline of the model are illustrated in the
following two figures.
Timeline of the Model
8In the paper, “the bank” is interchangeable with “the lender” and “the firms” is interchangeable with “the
borrowers”.
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Payoff Structure of the Investment Project
What we keep in mind here is the situation in which, before the project is started, the
two parties agree on the initial contract based on the ex-ante information of the date-1
payoff of the project. After the project starts, the borrower learns more product and market
information, which helps her to better know the quality of the investment.9 This is the case
especially for small- and medium-sized businesses.
Conditional on the good signal at date t, the original loan interest rate may not be fair any
more in a competitive credit market, because the credit quality of the firm is better than
the ex-ante expectation. Becoming more creditworthy, the borrower may have incentive to
prepay the original loan and to refinance it at a lower price, if the cost of prepayment is less
than the benefit. In practice, motivations for exercising the prepayment option are wide-
ranging. For mortgages, prepayments are mainly triggered by changes in market interest
rates. In contrast, most C&I loans have floating rates, so the impetus to refinance is beyond
changes of the market interest rates (Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Roberts, 2010). Roberts and
Sufi (2009) find that the accrual of new information concerning credit quality and outside
options is a strong predictor of the incidence of renegotiations including those for prepay-
9The literature (e.g. the continuous-time models) usually assumes that information concerning future
payoffs of the project arrives continuously and steadily, for example, following a pre-specified stochastic
process. In our model, much information comes shortly after the investment is launched. This should be a
more plausible assumption especially for new projects. In addition, introducing uncertainty after the signal
does not change the key model prediction.
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ments. We have introduced new information, i.e. the interim signal about changed credit
quality, to the model. Further let α be the costs of the borrower to access outside financing
options. The refinancing costs reflect time and effort spent by the contracting parties in
negotiating the new deal.
2.2 Prepayment and Non-interest Credit Rationing
In this section, we show how penalty-free prepayment induces credit rationing. To start,
consider the first-best case when the two contract parties perfectly commit to the original
contract regardless of the signal. In a competitive credit market, the lender breaks even ex
ante.
s(1 + r) + (1− s)D = 1 (1)
Given that the project has positive NPV ex ante, there is a unique solution to (1),
r∗ =
1
s
(1− s)(1−D). (2)
With the interest rate, r∗, the project can be financed. Although the lender will have a loss,
(s−b)(1−D)/s, following the bad signal, she will get a profit, (g−s)(1−D)/s, following the
good signal. Ex ante, the expected loss equates the expected benefit and the lender breaks
even. Therefore, with perfect commitment, the two contract parties are able to use only the
loan interest rate to reach an agreement. There is no role for non-price loan instruments or
the use of a non-linear pricing approach.
However, perfect commitment is not credible if prepayments are penalty-free. In practice,
prepayments for bank loans are mostly penalty-free. Let us first take it as an assumption
that the borrower is allowed to prepay the loan at date t freely.10 When observing the good
signal, the borrower prepays the original loan, so long as the refinancing costs are not too
high to offset the benefits from the cheaper new loan. In the case with prepayment, the
lender cannot capture the interest, r, after t. The participation constraint of the lender
10In section 5, we will discuss why prepayment penalties should not be included in C&I loan contracts.
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changes to
p(tr + 1) + (1− p)
[
b(1 + r) + (1− b)D
]
= 1 (3)
The left-hand of (3) includes two parts. The first part is the expected payoff to the lender
following the good signal. Being prepaid at date t, the lender gets the accrued interest before
t, tr, and the face value of the loan, 1. The second part is the expected payoff of the lender
following the bad signal. Rewrite (3) as
r =
(1− p)
{
1− [bU + (1− b)D]
}
+ b(U − 1)
b+ pt
. (4)
It is not difficult to get 1 + r > U if
t <
(1− p){1− [bU + (1− b)D]}
p(U − 1)
. (5)
In the model setup, we assume that the signal arrives shortly after the project is started.
Now let us further specify "shortly" as that (5) is satisfied, so the required payment for
the lender to break even is higher than the maximum payoff of the project. Such a high
interest rate is not feasible to be implemented because the borrower will terminate the
project after observing the bad signal. Suppose that the project will pay off zero if it is
abandoned after a bad signal and, in this case, the project is ex-ante not worth investing
in, i.e., p[gU + (1 − g)D] < 1. Then, conditional on a positive probability of prepayment,
the participation constraint of the lender, (3), is impossible to hold due to the prepayment
risk. Increasing the interest rate alone is not sufficient to compensate the lender because,
no matter how high the original interest rate is, the lender cannot capture the upside of the
project while losing money in the downside. Therefore, conditional on a positive probability
of prepayment, the borrower is credit rationed.
Obviously, refinance will not occur if and only if
g(1 + r) + (1− g)D < 1 + tr + α. (6)
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The left-hand side of (6) is the cost of the borrower to keep the original contract, while the
right-hand side is the cost to refinance the loan in a competitive credit market. Combine (1)
and (6), we get
(1−D)[g − (1− t)s− t] < sα. (7)
This is the necessary condition for refinance or prepayment not to occur. From (7), the
larger is α or t, the less likely is refinancing to occur, and so is credit rationing. In this
paper, we focus only on the interesting case in which α and t are low enough so that equa-
tion (7) is always satisfied. The parameters, s and D, respectively capture default risk and
loss-given-default risk, which are the principal credit risk factors according to Standard &
Poor’s (2009), while α captures competition and efficiency of the credit market.
Proposition 1: If voluntary prepayment is penalty-free, some risky borrowers with positive
NPV projects cannot get the loan they need even if they are willing to increase the interest
rate, resulting in credit rationing. In general, more risky borrowers with lower refinancing
costs are more likely to be credit rationed.
Proof : From the above reasoning, the proposition is intermediate.
For borrowers with high observed risk, the lender requires a high interest rate as compensa-
tion for potential losses in bad states. At the same time, the high interest rate induces the
borrower to refinance the loan after observing the good signal. Thus, the promised payment
from the borrower is not credible given that prepayments are penalty-free. Using only the
interest rate, the two contracting parties cannot reach an agreement that both avoids prepay-
ments and allows the lender to recoup her investment, so the lender resorts to non-interest
credit rationing. From (7), the prepayment risk can be mitigated by increasing s, D, α and t.
For example, the borrower may reduce default risk 1− s through certain hedging strategies
or reduce loss-in-default by pledging more collateral D to reduce the loan interest rate and to
deter prepayments. This is one of the main reasons for which collateral are widely observed
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in practice.11
In the model, no project being financed should be prepaid. It follows that no prepayment
could occur in equilibrium. However, prepayments are widely observed in practice as dis-
cussed above. It seems that the model prediction here is not consistent with the reality.
To see why, note that in our model, the necessary condition for credit rationing to occur
is equation (7), in which the lender’s loss is required to be sufficiently large following the
bad signal. This is not always the case. If the loan size is small comparing to the asset size
of the borrower, e.g. when the borrower has substantial initial net worth or collateral, the
loan can be fully paid even following the bad signal, and the project can be financed despite
penalty-free prepayments. More importantly, prepayments in practice occur for various rea-
sons other than what we discussed above. For example, LBOs, MBOs and takeovers may
also trigger firm recapitalization or debt refinance.
2.3 Non-linear Loan Pricing - the Use of Upfront Fees
Prepayments and hence credit rationing are induced by high interest rates. As analyzed in
the previous section, it is feasible to reduce the interest rate by pledging more collateral.
With a lower interest rate, prepayments are deterred and the project can be financed. How-
ever, collateral is limited and insufficient to reduce the interest rate low enough to deter
prepayments. In this case, other non-interest instruments may be necessary. For example,
the borrower may be required to invest some personal funds, to accept strict debt covenants
or to shorten the loan maturity.
In this section, we consider the use of a non-linear pricing approach to mitigate prepayment
risk. Our model assumes the signal arrives shortly after the contract is signed. That is, the
promised interest will be paid mostly after the signal. Intuitively, if the interest payment
is paid before the signal, prepayment can be deterred. From this intuition, the non-linear
pricing approach is employed to mitigate prepayment risk. In this approach, the loan price is
11Most bank loans are secured in practice. Among more than 86,000 U.S. C&I loans in the DealScan
database between 1987 and 2011, around 84% are secured.
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split into two parts: the linear part, or the interest, paid annually or quarterly; the non-linear
part, or the upfront fee, paid as a lump-sum in advance.
Denote the loan price as R. Assume that, if this price is charged only through interest,
prepayment will occur, i.e.
g(1 +R) + (1− g)D > 1 + tR + α. (8)
Note that (8) is obtained by replacing r to R in (6). As argued earlier, the project cannot be
financed due to prepayment risk. Now let consider the non-linear pricing approach. The loan
price, R, is split into the upfront fee, y, and the interest rate, r. The loan contract is (r, y) and
R = r + y. Conditional on a positive probability of prepayment, credit rationing occurs, so
any feasible contract should incentive-compatibly deter prepayments, i.e., be renegotiation-
proof. This calls for the incentive-compatibility constraint of the borrower when the good
signal is observed,
g(1 + r)(1 + y) + (1− g)D ≤ (1 + tr)(1 + y) + α. (9)
Note that the face value of the loan is 1 + y, which consists of the required one unit of
initial investment and the upfront fee. The left-hand side of (9) is the borrower’s expected
payment for the original contract conditional on a good signal, while the right-hand side
is that for refinancing the original contract. This equation ensures that the borrower will
not prepay the loan following a good signal and hence that the credit rationing problem is
solved. Inserting r = R− y into (9), we have
y2 +
[1− t
g − t
−R
]
· y +
[(1− g)(1−D) + α
g − t
−R
]
≥ 0 (10)
Inequality (10) implies the following proposition:
Proposition 2: An up-front fee, through reducing the interest rate, can be employed to
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mitigate prepayment risk. The minimum up-front fee, ŷ, satisfies
ŷ =
√
1
2
(1− g
g − t
−R
)2
+
(1− g)D − α
g − t
− 1
2
(1− g
g − t
+ 1−R
)
. (11)
Ceteris paribus, ŷ is higher with a lower refinancing cost and a higher loan price, i.e. ∂ŷ
∂R
> 0
and ∂ŷ
∂α
< 0.
Proof : Let A ≡ 1−g
g−t −R and B ≡
(1−g)D−α
g−t . Equation (10) changes to
y2 + (1 +A) · y + (A− B) ≥ 0.
Since we assume that α and t are sufficiently small, B > 0. For this quadratic inequality,
the discriminant is ∆ = (1 +A)2 − 4(A−B) = (1−A)2 + 4B > 0, so the positive solutions
satisfy
y ≥ ŷ =
√
(1−A)2 + 4B − (A− B)
2
.
From (7), we have A− B < 0 and hence ŷ > 0. Also since B > 0, 1 + 2ŷ +A > 0. Thus,
∂ŷ
∂R
=
1 + ŷ
1 + 2ŷ +A
> 0,
∂ŷ
∂α
= − 1
(1 + 2ŷ +A)(g − t)
< 0.
Q.E.D.
To finance the project, y ≥ ŷ has to be satisfied. By paying the loan price partly through an
upfront fee, the required interest rate is reduced and hence the borrower has less incentive
to strategically prepay the loan when observing the good signal. The use of upfront fees,
like collateral, makes the borrower commit to the original loan contract and hence solves the
credit rationing problem. It is obvious that a prepayment penalty has the same effect, so
a natural question is why not the prepayment penalty but the upfront fee. Our model will
not provide a complete answer to this question, but we will discuss more in section 5 about
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their differences.
2.4 Performance-sensitive Debt
In our model above, the date-t signal is non-verifiable, so the contract cannot be contingent
on the signal. If instead the signal is verifiable, how about the contract? One natural
thinking is to finance the project through a contract with maturity, t, for which prepayment
is irrelevant. However, (5) in our model setting indicates that any contract with maturity,
t, is not feasible because the ex-ante interest rate in (4) would be so high that all future
payoffs go to the lender. Therefore, even if the signal is verifiable, the maturity of the feasible
contract is still one. In the following, we will show that, although credit rationing cannot be
eliminated, the use of performance-sensitive debt (PSD) based on the signal mitigates the
prepayment risk.
PSD is one of the widely observed debt features in practice. Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi
(2010) report that, among bank loans to public firms in the 1995-2005 period in the Thomson
Financial’s SDC database, approximately 40% include performance-pricing provisions. A
traditional bank loan before its maturity is priced using a fixed interest spread over a floating
benchmark such as LIBOR or prime. Performance pricing instead has a spread based on the
measures of the borrower’s performance such as credit rating or debt-to-EBITDA ratio.
To extend our model, we allow the interest rate of the contract is contingent on the interim
signal, denoted as (rg, rb), where rg is the interest rate if the signal is good, rb is for the
bad signal, and rg ≤ rb < U . With this contract, two constraints are required to deter
prepayments. First, the participation constraint of the lender is
p[g(1 + rg) + (1− g)D] + (1− p)[b(1 + rb) + (1− b)D] = 1 (12)
pgrg + (1− p)brb = (1− s)(1−D). (13)
Since rb < U , (13) implies that
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pgrg > (1− s)(1−D)− (1− p)bU. (14)
Second, the incentive constraint of the borrower is
g(1 + rg) + (1− g)D ≤ 1 + trg + α. (15)
Combining (14) and (15), we have the necessary condition for prepayment not to occur
(1−D)[g − (1− t)s− t] < sα + 1
pg
(g − t)(1− p)b[sU + (1− s)D − 1 + s]. (16)
Without the last part, (16) is the same as (7). Because this last part is always positive, the
use of PSD to deter prepayments in (16) requires lower α than the use of straight debt to
do so in (7). That is, the use of PSD mitigates the prepayment risk. In nature, concerning
detering prepayments, charging an upfront fee works like increasing the refinancing costs.
Since PSD reduces prepayment risk comparing to the straight debt, it requires lower level of
upfront fees. In sum, we have
Proposition 3: Comparing with the straight debt, performance-sensitive debt mitigates the
prepayment risk and hence reduces the use of upfront fees.
Intuitively, the reclassification effects due to prepayments make the lender unable to capture
the high interest following the good signal, but she has to bear the loss following the bad
signal. As long as prepayment occurs, the lender cannot break even. Therefore, any feasible
contract must deter prepayments, or reduce the interest rate sufficiently to make refinance
following the good signal unprofitable. To reduce the interest rate, the upfront fee or other
non-interest instruments are necessary. Note that prepayment is relevant only following the
good signal, so the use of non-interest instruments aims to reduce the interest rate with
the good signal. When the fixed-rate straight debt is chosen, the non-interest instruments
are required to reduce the signal-independent interest rate. However, when PSD is chosen,
the non-interest instruments are only required to reduce the interest rate following the good
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signal. Therefore, performance-pricing reduces the use of non-interest instruments including
the upfront fee. It is reported that the use of performance-pricing in debt is used to save
refinancing costs (Asquith, Beatty, and Weber, 2005) or to mitigate adverse selection (Manso,
Strulovici, and Tchistyi, 2010), etc. Complementary to these findings, we document that the
use of performance-pricing substitutes for non-interest instruments.
3 Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
In practice, unlike bonds which compensate lenders through interest payments alone, bank
loans are frequently associated with an upfront fee, which is a one-time fee collected at the
closing of the transaction. As part of the loan price, the upfront fee is also a monetary
transfer from the borrower to the lender. It is traditionally thought of as compensation for
the lender’s fixed costs associated with originating the loan. For example, the largest part of
the upfront fee for a syndicated loan goes to the lead arranger as compensation for structuring
the loan (e.g., Ivashina, 2009). However, the fixed costs can also be charged through interest,
so this traditional “fixed-costs” story cannot explain why the fixed costs are charged in the
form of an upfront fee. Our model provides an alternative justification of the use of upfront
fees. Proposition 2 shows that the upfront fee can be used to mitigate prepayment risk and
hence to solve the rationing problem stemming from voluntary prepayments.
3.1 Testable Hypotheses
Our model generates a couple of testable predictions. First, from equation (11), ceteris
paribus, loans with higher prices, which are an indicator for the borrower’s willingness to
prepay, and loans with lower refinancing costs require higher upfront fees. This is our first
hypothesis.
Hypothesis I: The size of upfront fees is positively correlated with the loan price and neg-
atively correlated with refinancing costs.
Second, if the use of upfront fees is not associated with any deadweight cost, in our model a
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borrower with a positive-NPV project can always be financed by accepting a sufficiently high
upfront fee, and the upfront fee would have substituted all other non-interest loan terms.
However, this is not the case in practice. For example, empirically we observe that collateral
may be a more widely-used or more important debt feature than the upfront fee. On the one
hand, these other non-interest loan terms such as collateral may be used to compensate the
lender for various risks other than the prepayment risk, which are excluded in our model for
simplicity. On the other hand, we believe that the use of upfront fees induces deadweight
costs. When a borrower needs a loan in practice, she is vey likely liquidity-constrained. Only
the other less-expensive instruments have been exhausted, the upfront fee is used to deter
prepayments. Empirically, it is convenient to test the use of collateral, so we have the second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis II: Secured loans are associated with higher level of upfront fees.
Third, we document in Proposition 3 that PSD mitigates the prepayment risk and hence
reduces the use of upfront fees. Intuitively, when the interest rate is contingent on the signal,
it can be higher with the bad signal and hence lower with the good signal. Since a lower
interest rate with the good signal reduces the possibility of prepayments, PSD mitigates the
prepayment risk.
Hypothesis III: Performance-sensitive debt is associated with lower level of upfront fees.
Finally, the financial crisis in 2007-2009 had an influence on the credit markets, e.g. both
the level of loan prices and the design of loan contracts. After the crisis occurred in 2007, the
economy continues recovering but loan prices are still at historically high level. New issued
loans thus have higher probabilities to prepay due to potentially improved credit quality in
the future. This makes prepayment risk of even greater concern for the lender. We thus
conjecture that the effect on the use of upfront fees from the loan price in Hypothesis I
should be more pronounced during and after the financial crisis.
Hypothesis IV: Prepayment risk, or the loan price, has greater influence on the use of
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upfront fees during and shortly after the period of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
Empirically, we employ the following baseline model for our tests,
UpfrontFee = β0 + β1 ∗Price+ β2 ∗RfCost+ β3 ∗Security+ β4 ∗PSD+ Φ ∗X+ ε. (17)
where Price is the loan price, RfCost is the proxy for refinancing costs, Security or PSD
is the dummy indicating whether the loan is secured or has performance-pricing feature
respectively, and X is a set of control variables. By expectation, β1 and β3 in equation
(18) should be positive, β2 and β4 should be negative. If the upfront fee is only used as
compensation for the fixed costs of the lender, it should not be correlated with the loan price
after controlling for other loan characteristics. Therefore, a positive β1 indicates that the
role of the upfront fee goes beyond compensating the lender for fixed costs associated with
the loan origination.
To test Hypothesis IV, we include the dummy that is equal to one if the loan is issued
in 2007-2011, and its interaction term with the loan price. It is widely accepted that the
financial crisis was between 2007 and 2009, but we include year 2010 and 2011. In the two
years following the crisis, the economy was recovering but loan prices were still at historically
high level (see figure 1). The test is specified as follows
UpfrontFee = β0 + β1 ∗ Price+ βcrisis ∗Crisis+ γ ∗ Price ∗Crisis+ ...+ Φ ∗X+ ε. (18)
The coefficient γ captures the additional effects of the loan price on the use of upfront fees
during and shortly after the financial crisis. We expect γ to be positive.
Our theoretical model and the testable hypotheses are all concerning the use of term loans.
Shockley and Thakor (1997) argue that fees can be used as a screening device to sort bor-
rowers. In their model, the good borrowers are more likely to draw down loan commitments,
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so a commitment fee on the unused balance may screen out the bad borrowers. They pro-
vide empirical evidence to support this screening effect of fees, especially commitment fees
and utilization fees for credit lines. To exclude such a screening effect, we focus on term
loans instead of loan commitments. Term loans are almost always fully drawn down, so the
screening effect in the sense of Shockley and Thakor (1997) is trivial.
Loan contract terms are probably jointly determined, so endogeneity is an important issue
in our empirical study. The first line of defense against endogeneity is the clear theoretical
guidance that our theoretical model provides. MORE.......
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Data and Sample
The data used to test the hypothesis are taken from the LPC DealScan Database. Each
observation corresponds to a separate loan agreement. Most loans in the database are senior,
secured and syndications for medium- and large-sized firm borrowers. The database contains
the majority of new loans made to public firms in the United States.12 Since being available
in 1987, the database has become more comprehensive over time.
We start with all term loans in DealScan issued by U.S. borrowers between January 1987
and October 2011. Before 1992, there are only a few loans that have available upfront fee
information in DealScan, so we first drop loans issued before 1992. We also exclude loans
to regulated and financial industries, identified with the 2-digit SIC 40-45, 49, 60-69, and
90-99, and loans with negative interest spread. In the data, there are 20 term loans with
an upfront fee over 50 times higher than the all-in-spread, which by definition is the total
annual cost of the loan including the loan interest spread and annualized fees. The spread
of these loans is only 1 bps, which we think of as data mistakes and hence are dropped
from our sample. This results in a total of 26,950 term loans in our full sample, issued by
12According to Carey and Nini (2007), Dealscan has information on 50-75% of all U.S. commercial loan
volume into the early 1990s, with coverage increasing to 80 -90% from 1992-2002.
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10,310 different firms. To obtain borrower accounting information, we merge DealScan with
Compustat quarterly data using the link data provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). In
our full sample, 15,049 term loans issued by 4,428 different firms have borrower information
in Compustat. From the figures, we see that Compustat firms issue term loans more often
than the full sample firms. This is because Compustat firms are relatively larger and mostly
publicly listed. Finally, to reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers, we winsorize at the
upper and lower one percentiles the continuous ratio variables, including leverage, market-
to-book ratio, Profitability, Tangibility and Z-score.
4.2 Variable Description
All variables are defined and described in Table 1. The dependent variable is the upfront
fee, measured in basis points (bps). Our main interest is the effect on the size of the upfront
fee from the loan price, refinancing costs, security and performance-pricing. As discussed
above, it is the high interest rate that induce prepayments and hence credit rationing. Thus,
we use the loan interest spread, Spread, as the proxy for the loan price.13 We use dummies,
Syndication and ITL, which respectively indicate whether the loan is a syndicated loan and
an institutional term loan, as proxies for the refinancing costs.14 Syndication loans have mul-
tiple lenders, while ITLs are resold in the secondary markets. Both have complex structure
and are considered to be associated with higher refinancing/renegotiation costs compared
with traditional bank loans (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008).
The refinancing costs include bank syndication fees, legal and accounting costs and man-
agement time to structuring and syndicating the facilities in general. The dummies for
security and performance-pricing are Security and PSD. To test Hypothesis IV, we con-
struct a dummy variable, Crisis, which equals one in 2007-2011, and the interaction term
between Crisis and Spread, SprCrs = Crisis ∗ Spread.
13In the data, the upfront fee is a part of the all-in-spread, so the two should be positively correlated
regardless of whether prepayment risk plays any role in their relationship. For this reason, we choose the
interest spread instead of the all-in-spread as the proxy for the loan price.
14Institutional term loans (ITLs) include term loan B, C, D, etc.
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We control for a set of variables including non-price loan characteristics, borrower charac-
teristics and market conditions, which are commonly used in the empirical literature (e.g.
Ivashina, 2009). Non-price loan characteristics include the term loan amount (logAmount) in
million U.S. $,15 maturity (logMaturity) in months, loan purpose (Purpose),16 and dummy
variables indicating whether the loan is a refinance loan (Refinance) or an amendment loan
(Amendment).17 These non-price loan characteristics have available data in DealScan. They
affect the default risk and the prepayment risk of the loan and hence have impact on the use
of upfront fees.18 Usually, these non-price features of the loan are fixed before the syndica-
tion process. This justifies the use of the non-price loan characteristics as control variables
(Ivashina, 2009).
Borrower characteristics include firm size (logAssets) in million U.S. $, book leverage (Leverage),
borrower’s investment opportunities proxied by market-to-book ratio (Q), profitability (Profta-
bility), and tangibility (Tangbility).19 We also use total assets from Compustat to measure
firm size. Following Roberts (2010), the borrower characteristics are defined as follows. Book
leverage is the total debt divided by total assets, where total assets use the item, “Total As-
sets”, in Compustat and total debt is the sum of “Long-Term Debt” and “Debt in Current
Liabilities”. Market-to-book ratio is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and
total debt divided by total assets. It measures the future investment opportunities, which
should have a negative effect on the use of upfront fees. Profitability is measured by re-
15A loan deal in DealScan usually includes multiple tranches, for example, term loans (term loan A, B,
C...) and revolving credit lines. Although our tests concern only term loans, the size of the deal including
both term loans and revolvers may also have impact on the default risk of the loan. In all specifications,
when we include the deal size (logDeal) as a control variable, our results have no change.
16Following Carey, Post, and Sharp (1998), loan purposes are categorized into four groups: general pur-
poses (“working capital” and “general corporate purpose”), recapitalization (“debt repayment/consolidation”,
“recapitalization”, and “debtor-in-possession loan”), acquisition (“general or specific acquisition program” and
“LBO loans”) and others.
17Most loans in Dealscan are not the initial originated loan but refinanced or amended loans.
18Seniority is also an important loan characteristic. In DealScan, almost all loans are senior (more than
99.7%), so we do not include seniority as a control. Robustness check (not reported in the paper) shows that
seniority has no any substantial influence on the results.
19We also run regressions (results not reported in the paper) using credit rating score (Score) as the
measure of borrower risk. Credit rating score is a discrete variable, equaling 1 for S&P rating “AAA”, 2 for
“AA+”, 3 for “AA”, and so on. We lose a large number of observations, but the results have no substantial
change.
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turn on assets, equaling to “Operating Income Before Depreciation” divided by total assets.
Tangibility is the ratio of net PP&E to total assets.
Finally, we include the year dummies and industry dummies to control for market conditions.
There are 63 industry dummies using the 2-digit SIC codes excluding regulated and financial
industries.
4.3 Summary Statistics and Upfront fees in DealScan
The summary statistics of the variables are given in table 2. Panel A of the table shows the
summary statistics for the full sample, while panel B, C and D show those for observations
with non-missing upfront fees, non-missing loan characteristics and non-missing loan and
firm characteristics, respectively. From Panel A, around 16% of the observations in our
full sample include an upfront fee (4,876 out of 26,950). The mean and median are 93.8
bps and 62.5 bps respectively. The interest spread of term loans in the full sample has an
average of 318 bps and a median of 300 bps. Conditional on available upfront fee information
in DealScan, the upfront fee is around 31% of the spread of the loan, indicating that the
upfront fee is an substantial part of the loan price in addition to the interest.
The table shows that our full sample has a large number of missing values. The subsample
with non-missing loan and firm characteristics (with merged data between DealScan and
Compustat) has only 877 observations. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, a majority
of loans in DealScan have missing upfront fee information (84%). Second, more than half of
firms in DealScan are not included in the Compustat database. We know that Compustat
is mainly for large and public firms, but the reasons for missing upfront fees in DealScan
is not obvious. According to the LPC customer service, when no data was collected or
provided for the upfront fee item, LPC leaves it as “N/A”. Discussions with practical people
in commercial banks suggest that most loans have an upfront fee, but typically the upfront
fee is confidential and is signed in the fee letter separated from the loan contract in practice.
Being aware of the data quality of DealScan concerning the upfront fee, we conjecture that
the observations with missing upfront fee information may consist of three types: random
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missing values, self-selected hidden values, and zero-upfront fees.
Comparing the four panels of table 2, we see that the subsamples in Panel B, C and D
have higher mean spreads (339bps, 354bps, and 333bps) than the full sample (318bps). Also
the subsamples include less syndicated loans than the full sample (82%, 84% and 84% v.s.
93%) and more PSD (26%, 35% and 42% v.s. 19%). If the missing values of the upfront
fee variable is zero, the above differences between the subsamples and the full sample are
consistent with our model predictions that the use of upfront fee is increasing in the loan
price and loan security, but decreasing with refinancing costs and performance-pricing. This
will also be confirmed in table 3 and the results when we run the regressions taking the
missing upfront fees as zero in the robustness checks of the next section.
Table 3 shows the differences in means of loan and firm characteristics between the group
of loans with non-missing upfront fee information and those with missing upfront fee in-
formation. The characteristics are mostly significantly different across the two groups. For
example, loans with non-missing upfront fee information have higher interest spread, and are
less likely to be syndicated but more likely to be secured, PSD, refinance and amendment
loans. The borrowers of loans with non-missing upfront fee are more likely to be public, and
have slightly smaller asset size and lower profitability. These differences indicate that there
could be a selection problem in the data. For this reason, we will test our hypotheses also
using a Heckman selection model.
Figure 1 and 2 show the time variation of the means of our interested variables. From figure
1, we see that the upfront fee and the interest spread change overtime in similar patterns. In
most time, the upfront fee is about one third of the interest spread, but the ratio increases
to over 40% during the financial crisis. Figure 2 shows that more and more loans in our
full sample are syndicated over time, coinciding with the boom of leveraged loan markets.
The proportion of institutional term loans also increases over time except the drop during
the financial crisis. PSD is popular in the mid-1990s, but its use exhibits a decreasing trend
after 1997. The proportion of secured loans, except a drop during the crisis, is pretty stable.
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4.4 Tests and Results
4.4.1 Upfront Fees in Term Loans
Table 4 presents results of regressions on the upfront fee of term loans. For every specification,
we employ both OLS and Heckman selection models, control for the year and 2-digit industry
fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. The Heckman selection model is
used to mitigate the potential self-selection bias of the upfront fee observations in DealScan.
We use the dummy, Public, as an instrument in the selection equation. We expect that
public firms are more likely to release the upfront fee information due to SEC requirements
than private firms, while the use of upfront fees should not have significant difference between
public and private firms. To justify Public as the instrument, we include Public as a control
in OLS regressions and find that it is never significant in any specification. In DealScan,
loans to public firms have lower level of upfront fees (85bps) than private firms (100bps), but
this is because loans to public firms have lower spread (293bps v.s. 331bps) and more likely
to be PSD (31% v.s. 12%). Between loans issued to public firms and private firms who are
included in Compustat, there is no significant difference in the use of upfront fees.20
Table 4 shows that the upfront fee is increasing in the loan spread. In all specifications, a
100bps increase in the interest spread is on average associated with an over 15bps higher
upfront fee. This finding is consistent with our model prediction in Proposition 2 that
the upfront fee can be used to reduce the high interest rate of a loan and hence to deter
prepayments. It also indicates that the upfront fee is not used only to compensate the
lender for fixed costs. As expected, institutional loans (ITLs) have lower level of upfront
fees. We interpret this as that ITLs are sold in the secondary markets, so renegotiations and
refinance are both more time- and effort-consuming. In general, the upfront fees are higher
for secured loans but lower for performance-sensitive loans. We conjecture that the upfront
20For the 3,499 loans that have both the upfront fee information in DealScan and the accounting infor-
mation in Compustat, 2,040 are issued by public firms and 1,459 by private firms. The mean upfront fee is
84.1bps for the former and 87.5 for the latter. The two means are not significantly different (t-value, 1.16).
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fee is the “residual” instrument, used to deter prepayments only when the other non-interest
instruments such as collateral have been exhausted. The higher upfront fees in secured loans
confirm this conjecture. Among all the variables that we are interested in, only Syndication
has no significant effect on the use of upfront fees. We will show later that syndicated loans
are more likely include non-missing upfront fee information in DealScan so, if missing values
are likely to be zeros, syndication has a negative effect on the use of upfront fees.
Concerning the use of upfront fees during and after the financial crisis, the loan spread as
predicted has a significantly greater impact on the size of upfront fees in 2007-2011. In
column (3)-(4) of table 4, the interaction term between loan spread and financial crisis is
significantly positive. The effect from the loan spread on the use of upfront fees is almost
doubled during and after the financial crisis. Column (7)-(8) show similar results, with the
effect even tripling that in normal periods. Beyersdorf and Palacios (2008) report that during
and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis, some C&I loans have call provisions or have original
issue discounts (OIDs) in pricing, i.e. sold below par.21 The discount from par in the new
issue market is offered as a spread enhancement (Standard&Poor’s, 2009). In nature, the
OID plays a similar role to an upfront fee in deterring prepayments.
A couple of other control variables have significant coefficients. For example, loan amount
and maturity in general increase the use of upfront fees, while borrower asset size reduces it.
A larger loan size are more likely to be prepaid, because the interest is linear in the loan size
while refinancing costs are probably not. It is also reasonable that the use of upfront fees
is decreasing in asset size because a larger asset size makes the loan size relatively smaller.
However, it seems a contradiction that the upfront fee is negatively correlated with maturity.
Logically, loans with a longer maturity are more possible to be prepaid before the due date,
so higher upfront fees are expected. In the data, syndicated and/or institutional loans have
longer maturities, so the negative effect from maturity on the upfront fee could be due to
21Denis Beyersdorf and Luis Palacios, 2008, Overview of DealScan Data, a Joint Presentation by Thomson
Reuters and WRDS, available at https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/dealscan/company/
index.cfm.
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the higher refinancing costs of these loans.
4.4.2 Amending Data Problem for Deals with Multiple Tranches
A syndicated deal in DealScan may include multiple tranches including term loans or re-
volvers. A revolver is a line of credit where the customer pays a commitment fee and is then
allowed to use the funds when needed. It is typically used to provide liquidity for a com-
pany’s day-to-day operations. Except upfront fees, most of the loan characteristics within a
deal such as amount, spread and maturity are specified at tranche levels. In DealScan, if an
upfront fee is charged on the entire amount of the deal including both a term loans and a
revolver, LPC puts the fee only on the revolver. Therefore, our previous results based only
on term loans may be biased, if many term loans miss the upfront fee information because
they are issued together with revolvers.
To identify such an effect, we check in DealScan whether a large number/proportion of term
loans with missing upfront fee information are issued with a revolver credit line that includes
an upfront fee. There are 814 this type of term loans. This is a neglect able comparing to
the number of term loans with non-missing upfront fee information (4,876). We then take
the upfront fees of the credit line as that for the term loan in these deals, and obtain in total
5,690 observations with non-missing upfront fee. We run all the regression of table 4 and the
results are shown in table 5. There is no any change concerning our previous conclusions.
Furthermore, we include both term loans and revolver credit lines in the regressions. The
full sample now has 26,950 term loans and 43,156 revolver credit lines. All revolver credit
lines are specified as non-ITLs. The results, reported in table 6, again have no change.
4.4.3 Further Robustness Checks
We pursue a couple of further robustness checks. First, there is no zero upfront fee in
DealScan, so the missing values of the upfront fee must consist of some zeros. As table 3
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shows that the loans with missing upfront fee information are significantly different from the
loans with non-missing upfront fee information. We attribute this difference as self-selection
of borrowers to release the upfront fee information. It is also possible that the differences
are because the loans with missing upfront fee information have zero upfront fees. According
to the LPC customer service, when no data was collected or provided for the upfront fee
item, LPC leaves it as “N/A”. This makes the possibility even higher. Therefore, we take all
missing values of the upfront fee as zero and check the robustness of our previous results.
Since the upfront fee is truncated at zero, we employ both OLS and Tobit models. The
results are shown in table 7. Compared with those in the previous tables, the coefficients
are barely changed except that Syndication now has a significantly negative coefficient. If
the missing values of the upfront fee include many zeros, this negative effect confirms our
model prediction that refinancing costs reduce the use of upfront fees. Second, we control
for 3-digit SIC industry fixed effects (table 8) and find that our results are not driven by the
industry classification.
5 Why Prepayments Are Penalty-free?
So far, we document that non-interest terms are necessary to deter prepayments. However,
the use of these terms, e.g. collateral, may trigger additional costs (see e.g. Berger, Frame,
and Ioannidou, 2011b). First, if the lender and the borrower have divergent valuations of
the pledged assets, there is a deadweight loss due to the inefficient delivery of collateral in
default (Barro, 1976). Second, the borrower loses the full control of the pledged assets to
the lender, and may not be able to make the best use of these assets. Finally, the lender
bears costs of screening, monitoring and repossessing the pledged assets. Similarly, the use
of upfront fees for liquidity-constrained firms may be costly, as we argued earlier.
It is natural to think of a prepayment penalty as the substitute for the non-interest terms
to deter prepayments. In practice, however, most private debt agreements do not carry any
prepayment penalty, while non-price instruments are widely observed debt features. This
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suggests that keeping the option of penalty-free prepayments for the borrower in C&I loans
must be a rational choice of the contract parties. To our knowledge, no other paper discusses
this issue in the literature. We make the first attempt to fill the gap in this section. It is worth
noting that the main predictions of the model are materially independent of the reasons for
penalty-free prepayments.
5.1 Financial Flexibility
Beyond the simple purpose of replacing the current loan by a cheaper loan, prepayments
may occur for many other reasons, e.g. the arrival of new investment opportunities and
takeovers, or the change of the previous business plan adapting to the uncertain competi-
tive environment. Therefore, although a penalty can eliminate prepayment risk due to the
borrower fleeing to cheaper funding, it imposes additional costs on the borrower to make
new investments and to modify business plans. One could consider a penalty contingent
on the purpose of prepayments. This is the case in mortgage markets, where refinancing
due to home movements can be easily separated from those due to changes of the market
interest rate. However, it is generally difficult and costly for the lender to distinguish the
purpose of prepayments for C&I loans. Consequently, to avoid inappropriately penalizing
refinancing with other purposes than fleeing to cheaper funding, the optimal choice is to
exclude prepayment penalty in the contract ex ante.
The option of penalty-free prepayments enables the borrower to mitigate debt overhang
(Myers, 1977) and risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If prepayment is forbidden or
charged with high penalties, the borrower may have to pass up some positive NPV projects
that reduce borrower risk or choose only the risky projects to undertake. Over time, risk-
shifting also leaves the lender with only risky borrowers. Instead, non-price instruments such
as collateral mitigate risk-shifting.
Given that both non-interest terms and prepayment penalties are costly, there is a trade-
off between the two dimensions of financial flexibility: callability and constraints on the
non-price loan instruments. The option to call the loan freely at any time has important
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value for firms with large growth opportunities and firms facing intensive competition. For
these firms, non-pricing credit rationing is a way to grant the borrower the call option,
while compensating the lender with seniority, security, restrictive covenants, etc. For the
largest firms with few investment opportunities and in less competitive industries, the gain
from the option to prepay freely cannot offset the costs from the restrictions on the non-
price instruments. For these firms, it is optimal to give up this option in favor of relaxing
some restrictions on the non-price instruments and instead rely on bond markets as a main
funding source. Consistent with the above argument, the following table, Features of C&I
Bank Loans and Bonds, compares some features of C&I loans and bonds. C&I loan borrowers
hold the free call option while accepting more strict constraints on non-interest terms. In
contrast, bond issuers give up the free call option to relax constraints on these terms.
Features of C&I Bank Loans and Bonds
C&I Loans Bonds
Borrower Size all sizes large
Callability call freely no call or call with
premium
Non-price
Instruments
Pricing non-linear linear
Rate floating rate fixed rate
Payments amortizing non-amortizing
Seniority senior not senior
Security secured unsecured
Covenants more less
Maturity shorter longer
5.2 Adverse Selection
Adverse selection could be another reason to allow for penalty-free prepayments. The credit
rationing model in Section 2 assumes ex-ante symmetric information. If there are two types
of borrowers and the good type has a high probability to receive a good signal than the
bad type, intuitively prepayment penalty penalizes the good type more than the bad type
because it triggers only in the good state, while collateral penalizes the bad type more than
the good type because it delivers only in default. Therefore, prepayment penalty in a loan
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contract results in adverse selection, but collateral does not. In competitive credit markets,
any contract that pools different risks should exclude prepayment penalty.
5.3 Time Inconsistency
By construction, the upfront fee reduces the interest payment similar to a prepayment penalty
paid in advance. What is the difference for the borrower between paying the “penalty” at
the time of prepayment and paying in advance? One important reason is that prepayment
penalty induces the time-inconsistency problem in the sense that ex-ante optimal contract
may not be optimal ex post (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). When the contract is signed
at date 0, the future payoff of the project is uncertain so that the risk premium including
both fees and interest is forwarding-lookingly fair. In contrast, when the signal arrives, the
borrower has better outside options and hence more bargain power. If the lender rejects pre-
payments or renegotiations and still forces the borrower to pay the currently-unfair interest,
the lender might lose a good reputation or destroy the good borrower-lender relationship. In
an extreme case for small businesses, if the borrower is denied to prepay the loan, she might
choose to walk away (e.g. Hart and Moore, 1994). This may force the lender to accept pre-
payments ex post and then induce credit rationing ex ante for borrowers with severe hold-up
problems. The influence of human capital is larger for small firms and firms with high R&D
investment, especially start-ups. For this reason, venture capital widely uses non-compete
and vesting provisions to mitigate hold-up problems (e.g. Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).
6 Conclusion
This paper links the option of penalty-free prepayments and credit rationing in C&I loan
markets. Given that the borrower keeps the option to prepay the loan without penalty, the
lender cannot recoup her investment because voluntary prepayments limit her gains from
the upside of the investment project. If the downside NPV of the project is negative, ex
ante the two contract parties are not able to to sign a mutually beneficial loan agreement by
altering the interest rate alone, resulting in credit rationing. To finance the investment, the
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loan interest rate must be low enough to incentive-compatibly deter prepayments. One way
to reduce the interest rate is to use non-price instruments such as collateral. For borrowers
with higher observed risk or lower refinancing costs, the minimum requirement of collateral
is higher. This inference is consistent with extant empirical evidence (e.g. Berger, Frame,
and Ioannidou, 2011a,b). Another way is to employ a non-linear pricing approach, in which
the price of the loan is split into two parts, the interest rate and a lump-sum upfront fee. The
minimum required fee is higher for loans with higher prepayment risk and lower refinancing
costs. Using a sample of over 22,950 loans issued by U.S. borrowers between 1992 and
2011, we provide evidence supporting this prediction. First, loans with higher spreads are
associated with higher upfront fees. Second, loans with higher refinancing costs, syndication
loans (vs. traditional bank loans) and/or institutional term loans (v.s. non-ITLs), are
associated with lower upfront fees. Third, the upfront fee is higher for secured loans and
lower for performance-sentitive loans.
Non-price instruments and the upfront fee induce deadweight costs. One may thank that pre-
payment penalty could be a feasible substitute. In practice, however, prepayment exclusions
and prepayment penalties are extremely rare. We argue that the main rationale to allow
penalty-free prepayments is to maintain the borrower’s financial flexibility to capture future
investment opportunities, to mitigate adverse selection, and to avoid the time-inconsistency
problem in financial contracting.
In general, voluntary prepayments in C&I loan markets have attracted little attention in the
prior literature. We make a first step to explain why prepayments are penalty-free for C&I
loans and to identify the role of collateral and fees in deterring prepayments.
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Figure 1: The Interest Spread and Upfront Fees Overtime
Figure 2: Some Loan Characteristics Overtime
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Table 1: Variable Description
The table shows the notation and definition of variables used in our analysis. The variables are classified into
four categories: dependent variable, loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, and market conditions.
Items Description
Dependent Variable
UpfrontFee Upfront fee measured in bps
Loan Characteristics
Spread Interest spread or margin of the term loan, measured in bps
AIS The loan price or all-in-spread drawn measured in bps
Syndication Dummy =1 for syndicated loans
ITL Dummy =1 for institutional term loans (ITLs)
Security Dummy =1 for secured loans
PSD Dummy =1 for performance-sensitive debt (loans with performance-pricing)
Crisis Dummy =1 in the period from 2007 to 2011
logAmount The logarithm of the tranche size measured in U.S.
logMaturity The logarithm of the tranche maturity measured in months
Refinance Dummy =1 for refinance loans
Amend Dummy =1 for loans with amendments
Purpose Dummies for the four loan purposes, including general purposes (work-
ing capital and general corporate purposes), recapitalization (debt repay-
ment/consolidation, recapitalization, and debtor-in-possession loans), ac-
quisition (general or specific acquisition program and LBO loans), and Oth-
ers.
Borrower Characteristics
Public Dummy =1 for listed borrowers
logAssets The natural logarithm of Total Assets measured in million U.S. dollar, i.e.
log(atq)
Q Market value/Total Assets, i.e. (atq − (atq − ltq + txditcq) + (prccq ∗
cshoq))/atq
Leverage Total Liabilities/Total Assets, i.e. (dlcq + dlttq)/atq
Profitability EBITDA/Total Assets, i.e. oibdpq/atq
Tangibility PP&E/Total Assets, i.e. ppentq/atq
CashFlowRisk Variance of EBITDA calculated using observations in the past eight quarters
in Compustat, divided by Total Assets.
Z-Score The Altman’s Z-Score = 1.2 ∗ ((actq − lctq)/atq) + 1.4 ∗ (req/atq) + 3.3 ∗
(piq/atq) + 0.6 ∗ ((prccq ∗ cshoq)/ltq) + 0.999 ∗ (saleq/atq)
Market Conditions
Year Year dummy
Industry Industry dummy
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
The table presents the summary statistics for all the variables in Table 1. Panel A is for the full
sample, while B,C and D are for the sample with observations that have non-missing upfront fee,
no any missing loan characteristics and no any missing loan and firm characteristics, respectively.
Variable Mean p25 p50 p75 SD N
Panel A: All loans in our full sample
UpfrontFee 93.75 37.50 62.50 100.00 91.28 4,876
Spread 317.96 225.00 300.00 375.00 169.92 23,404
Syndication 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.28 26,494
ITL 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 26,950
Security 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.26 15,203
PSD 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 26,950
logAmount 17.64 16.62 17.73 18.83 1.69 26,610
logMaurity 3.90 3.58 4.09 4.28 0.67 23,815
Refinance 0.72 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 16,119
Amendment 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 25,803
Public 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 26,950
logAssets 17.64 16.27 17.66 18.93 1.94 11,469
Leverage 0.45 0.25 0.41 0.59 0.31 11,066
Q 1.69 1.06 1.35 1.83 1.54 9,032
Profitability 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 10,551
Tangibility 0.31 0.13 0.26 0.44 0.23 11,419
CashFlowRisk 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.10 10,973
ZScore 1.71 0.51 1.22 2.17 4.86 9,152
Panel B: No missing values in the upfront fee
UpfrontFee 93.75 37.50 62.50 100.00 91.28 4,876
Spread 338.68 237.50 305.00 405.00 165.91 4,363
Syndication 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.39 4,755
ITL 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 4,876
Security 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.23 3,853
PSD 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 4,876
logAmount 17.65 16.30 17.99 19.11 1.98 4,826
logMaurity 3.92 3.58 4.09 4.29 0.66 4,438
Refinance 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 2,825
Amendment 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 4,538
Public 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 4,876
logAssets 17.28 15.72 17.24 18.69 1.97 2,748
Leverage 0.44 0.23 0.41 0.59 0.31 2,643
Q 1.73 1.07 1.36 1.87 1.57 2,185
Profitability 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 2,516
Tangibility 0.32 0.13 0.26 0.45 0.23 2,739
CashFlowRisk 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 2,617
ZScore 1.76 0.44 1.11 2.11 4.75 2,215
(continuing in the next page)
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Variable Mean p25 p50 p75 SD N
Panel C: No missing values in loan characteristics
UpfrontFee 85.62 33.33 61.72 100.00 87.96 1,975
Spread 353.78 250.00 325.00 405.00 168.53 1,975
Syndication 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 1,975
ITL 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 1,975
Security 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.23 1,975
PSD 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 1,975
logAmount 17.73 16.22 18.13 19.34 2.07 1,975
logMaurity 3.91 3.58 4.09 4.28 0.64 1,975
Refinance 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.41 1,975
Amendment 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 1,975
Public 0.52 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1,975
logAssets 17.48 15.99 17.64 18.91 1.94 1,293
Leverage 0.45 0.25 0.41 0.58 0.30 1,248
Q 1.69 1.00 1.25 1.75 1.93 1,025
Profitability 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 1,184
Tangibility 0.31 0.13 0.25 0.45 0.23 1,290
CashFlowRisk 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 1,240
ZScore 1.50 0.35 0.99 1.85 4.39 1,057
Panel D: No missing values in loan and borrower characteristics
UpfrontFee 77.27 25.00 50.00 100.00 76.34 874
Spread 333.06 225.00 300.00 400.00 163.87 874
Syndication 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 874
ITL 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 874
Security 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.23 874
PSD 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 874
logAmount 17.50 15.89 17.73 19.23 2.13 874
logMaurity 3.86 3.58 4.09 4.28 0.67 874
Refinance 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.39 874
Amendment 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 874
Public 0.73 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 874
logAssets 17.34 15.87 17.47 18.72 1.89 874
Leverage 0.41 0.24 0.38 0.54 0.28 874
Q 1.69 1.01 1.27 1.76 1.90 874
Profitability 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 874
Tangibility 0.30 0.12 0.23 0.45 0.23 874
CashFlowRisk 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 874
ZScore 1.48 0.43 1.05 1.92 4.35 874
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Table 3: Differences in Firm and Loan Characteristics: non-missing v.s. missing upfront fees
The table presents average firm and loan characteristics for loans with non-missing upfront fee
information and those with missing upfront fee information. Variables are described in Table 1.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Variable Non-missing Missing Difference
N Mean N Mean
Spread 4,362 339 19,042 313 26***
Syndication 4,753 0.82 21,741 0.93 -0.11***
ITL 4,874 0.30 22,076 0.30 0.00
Security 3,851 0.94 11,352 0.92 0.02***
PSD 4,874 0.26 22,076 0.17 0.09***
logAmount 4,824 17.7 21,786 17.6 0.01
logMaturity 4,473 3.92 19,378 3.89 0.03**
Refinance 2,824 0.77 13,295 0.71 0.06***
Amendment 4,536 0.12 21,267 0.10 0.02***
Pubic 4,874 0.43 22,076 0.33 0.10***
logAssets 2,747 17.3 8,722 17.8 -0.05***
Leverage 2,642 0.44 8,424 0.45 -0.01
Q 2,184 1.73 6,848 1.68 0.05
Profitability 2,515 0.02 8,036 0.03 -0.01***
Tangibility 2,738 0.32 8,681 0.30 0.02**
CashFlowRisk 2,616 0.02 8,357 0.02 0.00
ZScore 2,214 1.77 6,938 0.74 1.03
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Table 4: The Use of Upfront Fees in Term Loans
The table presents results of regressions on the upfront fee of term loans. The columns differ in the variables
included as well as the empirical model employed, as indicated by the column headers. All the variables are
described in Table 1, and all the regressions control for the year and 2-digit industry fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Spread 0.183*** 0.222*** 0.150*** 0.172*** 0.193*** 0.250*** 0.146*** 0.187**
(9.81) (5.14) (9.18) (5.26) (7.54) (3.11) (6.70) (2.53)
Syndication 5.887 -28.093 2.852 -23.038 12.037* -56.152 7.212 -72.831
(0.97) (-0.77) (0.48) (-0.68) (1.65) (-0.70) (1.02) (-0.78)
ITL -14.800*** -17.724*** -11.932*** -13.842** -22.117*** -31.121 -16.850*** -25.602
(-3.20) (-2.92) (-2.60) (-2.53) (-3.39) (-1.50) (-2.70) (-1.12)
Security 21.900*** 43.166* 21.609*** 37.246* 32.895*** 122.134 28.081*** 128.599
(3.02) (1.80) (3.05) (1.72) (3.68) (1.17) (3.60) (1.10)
PSD -9.260** -8.986* -8.730** -8.416* -7.469 -9.869 -5.392 -7.055
(-2.40) (-1.81) (-2.26) (-1.83) (-1.47) (-0.61) (-1.06) (-0.38)
Crisis - -40.311* - -62.362
- (-1.92) - (-0.61)
Sprd_Crisis 0.130** 0.155*** 0.281*** 0.404**
(2.37) (3.62) (3.32) (2.09)
logAmount 4.820*** 9.903* 4.681*** 8.419* 11.221*** 18.205 10.524*** 18.102
(3.25) (1.78) (3.18) (1.68) (3.01) (1.64) (2.99) (1.47)
logMaturity -6.080* -4.056 -7.454** -6.115* -8.591 7.184 -11.418** 5.552
(-1.66) (-0.98) (-2.00) (-1.65) (-1.62) (0.34) (-2.15) (0.24)
Refinance -7.013 -13.948 -7.247 -12.456 -2.234 -34.631 -1.932 -38.436
(-1.05) (-1.50) (-1.08) (-1.45) (-0.28) (-0.82) (-0.26) (-0.81)
Amendment -4.287 -4.338 -4.105 -3.987 -1.415 9.521 -2.163 10.896
(-0.91) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.78) (-0.24) (0.44) (-0.36) (0.44)
logAssets -6.975** -9.405 -6.360* -8.996
(-2.05) (-1.09) (-1.89) (-0.92)
Leverage -7.041 -18.322 -5.099 -18.060
(-0.62) (-0.54) (-0.46) (-0.47)
Q -1.973 -1.543 -2.063 -1.424
(-1.05) (-0.27) (-1.09) (-0.22)
Profitability -19.324 -412.089 -29.215 -471.498
(-0.31) (-0.86) (-0.45) (-0.88)
Tangibility -0.790 -30.143 -4.465 -37.727
(-0.05) (-0.58) (-0.32) (-0.63)
CashFlowRisk -55.890 -677.414 -27.905 -722.703
(-0.40) (-0.84) (-0.19) (-0.80)
ZScore 0.189 -0.094 0.230 -0.124
(0.42) (-0.05) (0.44) (-0.05)
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1975 8774 1975 8774 874 3780 874 3780
adj. R2 0.2830 0.2922 0.3021 0.3433
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Table 5: The Use of Upfront Fees in Term Loans (Adjusted)
The table presents results of regressions on the adjusted upfront fee of term loans. In DealScan, if an upfront
fee is charged on the entire amount of the deal, LPC will put that fee only on the revolving credit. To check
whether this data collecting process generates some bias, if a term loan has no upfront fee information but
is in the same deal accompanied by a revolver credit line with an upfront fee, we take the upfront fee of
the credit line as that for the term loan, and we then have the adjusted upfront fees of term loans for the
regressions in this table. The columns differ in the variables included as well as the empirical model employed,
as indicated by the column headers. All the variables are described in Table 1, and all the regressions control
for the year and 2-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected
for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values
are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Spread 0.167*** 0.183*** 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.179*** 0.188*** 0.140*** 0.144***
(10.86) (7.05) (9.66) (7.91) (7.72) (8.57) (6.71) (7.73)
Syndication 2.451 -15.407 -0.095 -22.785 12.025* -2.574 8.394 -20.573
(0.43) (-0.56) (-0.02) (-0.86) (1.79) (-0.09) (1.29) (-0.67)
ITL -9.803*** -6.855 -7.835** -3.920 -17.420*** -14.989** -12.945** -7.506
(-2.64) (-1.16) (-2.13) (-0.65) (-3.17) (-2.16) (-2.37) (-0.90)
Security 22.173*** 31.098** 22.014*** 32.827** 28.131*** 43.863 27.279*** 56.735*
(3.64) (2.05) (3.68) (2.29) (3.59) (1.46) (3.58) (1.78)
PSD -7.283** -8.167** -6.655** -7.634* -8.663* -10.154* -6.521 -8.841
(-2.16) (-2.04) (-1.97) (-1.90) (-1.91) (-1.83) (-1.47) (-1.45)
Crisis . -67.877*** . -110.107***
. (-3.74) . (-3.96)
Sprd_Crisis 0.117*** 0.146*** 0.222*** 0.286***
(2.66) (3.54) (2.99) (3.66)
logAmount 4.519*** 7.159* 4.328*** 7.539* 9.768*** 11.513*** 9.138*** 12.258***
(3.41) (1.73) (3.28) (1.95) (2.79) (2.91) (2.74) (2.91)
logMaturity -4.568 -3.868 -5.360* -4.668 -5.419 -2.234 -7.360 -1.772
(-1.48) (-1.32) (-1.74) (-1.61) (-1.14) (-0.33) (-1.54) (-0.25)
Refinance -7.115 -8.600* -7.484 -9.367* -3.212 -8.637 -3.375 -13.510
(-1.24) (-1.72) (-1.31) (-1.86) (-0.44) (-0.74) (-0.49) (-1.06)
Amendment -1.909 -1.181 -1.726 -0.638 1.849 4.083 1.845 6.426
(-0.47) (-0.27) (-0.44) (-0.14) (0.34) (0.60) (0.34) (0.82)
logAssets -4.839 -4.788* -4.674 -4.503
(-1.51) (-1.93) (-1.46) (-1.58)
Leverage -4.430 -5.718 -3.224 -5.620
(-0.41) (-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.49)
Q -1.781 -1.758 -1.792 -1.685
(-0.97) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-0.82)
Profitability -31.879 -108.749 -37.354 -181.078
(-0.54) (-0.72) (-0.62) (-1.13)
Tangibility -0.415 -4.002 -2.908 -9.645
(-0.03) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.61)
CashFlowRisk -42.155 -167.896 -20.827 -252.766
(-0.32) (-0.64) (-0.15) (-0.91)
ZScore 0.292 0.190 0.315 0.111
(0.69) (0.29) (0.66) (0.15)
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 2356 8774 2356 8774 1038 3780 1038 3780
adj. R2 0.2688 0.2766 0.2865 0.3137
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Table 6: The Use of Upfront Fees in both Term Loans and Revolver Credit Lines
The table presents empirical results when the effect from the financial crisis is considered. All the variables
are described in Table 1. The dependent variable is the upfront fee. Column (1)-(3) are based on the
“DealScan Sample” while (4)-(6) are on the “DealScan-Compustat Sample”. The results include two OLS
regressions and one Logit regression. In the Logit model, the upfront fee is a binary dummy variable, equaling
zero for a “N/A” and one otherwise. In the first OLS model, all “N/As” in the sample are considered as zero.
In the second OLS model, all “N/As” are considered as random missing values. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Spread 0.214*** 0.211*** 0.184*** 0.194*** 0.207*** 0.193*** 0.173*** 0.169***
(16.19) (7.62) (15.51) (8.88) (11.26) (12.13) (10.67) (13.83)
Syndication 4.974 6.501 3.434 -3.665 6.618* 16.559* 4.766 9.531
(1.61) (0.43) (1.12) (-0.25) (1.71) (1.73) (1.24) (1.10)
ITL -14.360*** -14.176*** -13.830*** -13.912*** -17.537*** -14.810*** -16.529*** -15.180***
(-3.69) (-4.78) (-3.55) (-4.63) (-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.88) (-3.45)
Security 9.908*** 8.677 10.763*** 16.425 8.059*** -3.481 8.035*** 2.772
(4.00) (0.70) (4.42) (1.37) (2.82) (-0.32) (2.92) (0.29)
PSD -10.178*** -10.327*** -9.354*** -8.748*** -9.845*** -8.729*** -8.454*** -8.064***
(-4.81) (-4.30) (-4.43) (-3.55) (-3.58) (-2.85) (-3.16) (-3.00)
Crisis - -53.827*** - -65.701***
- (-2.99) - (-4.82)
Sprd_Crisis 0.134*** 0.148*** 0.212*** 0.198***
(3.73) (4.74) (4.09) (6.33)
logAmount 4.329*** 4.214*** 3.867*** 4.322*** 3.567* 1.606 3.105* 2.212
(5.26) (3.38) (4.82) (3.69) (1.94) (0.73) (1.78) (1.17)
logMaturity 0.517 0.575 -0.038 -0.310 2.760 1.408 2.404 1.775
(0.31) (0.38) (-0.02) (-0.21) (1.16) (0.61) (1.03) (0.86)
Refinance -8.631** -8.023 -8.212** -10.776* -9.937** -3.627 -8.168** -5.289
(-2.55) (-1.31) (-2.43) (-1.83) (-2.41) (-0.55) (-2.02) (-0.92)
Amendment -1.830 -2.085 -1.366 -0.297 -0.839 -3.575 -0.195 -1.500
(-0.77) (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.09) (-0.29) (-0.92) (-0.07) (-0.43)
logAssets 1.039 3.633 0.978 2.182
(0.66) (1.38) (0.62) (0.95)
Leverage 5.887 12.222 5.045 8.041
(0.85) (1.55) (0.73) (1.15)
Q -1.836** -2.387** -1.701* -1.964**
(-2.01) (-2.16) (-1.85) (-2.10)
Profitability -31.593 34.942 -41.434 -11.033
(-1.25) (0.53) (-1.61) (-0.19)
Tangibility 4.709 12.992 3.709 7.551
(0.62) (1.25) (0.51) (0.82)
CashFlowRisk 12.133 67.617 11.468 36.185
(0.22) (0.94) (0.20) (0.57)
ZScore 0.022 0.352 -0.009 0.145
(0.07) (0.81) (-0.03) (0.38)
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5080 23572 5080 23572 2552 11549 2552 11549
adj. R2 0.3110 0.3225 0.3096 0.3369
42
Table 7: Robustness Check 1: taking missing upfront fees as zero
The table presents results of regressions on the upfront fee of term loans, taking missing value of the upfront
fee as zero. The columns differ in the variables included as well as the empirical model employed, as indicated
by the column headers. All the variables are described in Table 1, and all the regressions control for the
year and 2-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for
heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are
shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Spread 0.046*** 0.133*** 0.032*** 0.102*** 0.041*** 0.097*** 0.029*** 0.069***
(8.43) (7.56) (7.11) (24.14) (4.69) (3.90) (3.90) (11.32)
Syndication -11.430*** -53.973*** -12.650*** -56.515*** -6.575** -33.988*** -7.686** -36.453***
(-4.16) (-5.81) (-4.62) (-27.91) (-2.07) (-2.96) (-2.44) (-13.11)
ITL 1.029 -5.686 1.400 -4.179*** -2.912 -9.751 -2.284 -7.785***
(0.77) (-1.06) (1.04) (-2.69) (-1.27) (-1.18) (-1.01) (-3.72)
Security 11.276*** 48.436*** 10.656*** 47.025*** 13.146*** 65.076*** 12.419*** 63.140***
(5.33) (4.57) (5.08) (23.46) (5.34) (4.73) (5.15) (22.65)
PSD -2.089* -3.160 -1.902 -2.686* -2.667 -5.871 -2.128 -4.741**
(-1.69) (-0.58) (-1.54) (-1.95) (-1.45) (-0.82) (-1.16) (-2.43)
Crisis -69.065*** -814.093*** - -739.842***
(-6.55) (-208.88) - (-129.87)
Sprd_Crisis 0.059*** 0.122*** 0.064** 0.142***
(3.57) (17.82) (2.13) (13.68)
logAmount 3.014*** 11.071*** 2.949*** 10.821*** 3.429** 9.146** 3.261** 8.697***
(5.62) (5.09) (5.55) (92.16) (2.42) (2.02) (2.34) (52.51)
logMaturity -0.842 0.547 -1.148 -0.359 -0.054 5.063 -0.490 3.754***
(-0.70) (0.14) (-0.95) (-0.70) (-0.03) (0.96) (-0.30) (5.17)
Refinance -3.961** -15.684** -4.058** -15.852*** -6.273** -23.728** -6.144** -23.043***
(-2.08) (-2.24) (-2.15) (-8.70) (-2.04) (-2.34) (-2.04) (-8.92)
Amendment 0.232 -1.756 0.705 -0.938 0.762 4.893 1.181 5.496***
(0.16) (-0.27) (0.48) (-0.66) (0.39) (0.61) (0.62) (2.69)
logAssets -1.197 -4.522 -1.120 -4.335***
(-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.79) (-25.93)
Leverage -2.603 -8.975 -2.295 -8.835**
(-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.51) (-2.11)
Q -0.346 -0.852 -0.264 -0.710
(-0.33) (-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.93)
Profitability -28.836 -201.666** -26.850 -194.320***
(-0.98) (-1.99) (-0.92) (-13.17)
Tangibility -7.229 -21.718 -7.155 -22.100***
(-1.37) (-1.13) (-1.38) (-4.08)
CashFlowRisk -17.382 -317.174* -13.782 -298.846***
(-0.46) (-1.84) (-0.37) (-6.88)
ZScore 0.113 0.174 0.107 0.159
(0.23) (0.12) (0.21) (1.13)
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 8774 8774 8774 8774 3780 3780 3780 3780
adj./pseudo R2 0.1194 0.0451 0.1255 0.0457 0.0984 0.0405 0.1060 0.0414
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Table 8: Robustness Check 2: 3-digit SIC industry fixed effects
The table presents results of regressions on the upfront fee of term loans. The columns differ in the variables
included as well as the empirical model employed, as indicated by the column headers. All the variables are
described in Table 1, and all the regressions control for the year and 3-digit industry fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Spread 0.185*** 0.218*** 0.152*** 0.167*** 0.203*** 0.243*** 0.157*** 0.180***
(8.78) (6.53) (8.80) (6.43) (7.38) (4.20) (7.38) (3.56)
Syndication 4.008 -23.310 1.703 -14.575 11.802 -51.916 9.038 -51.496
(0.62) (-0.91) (0.27) (-0.63) (1.48) (-0.88) (1.16) (-0.92)
ITL -14.941*** -17.320*** -12.015** -13.205*** -24.657*** -30.854* -19.729*** -24.747
(-3.04) (-3.17) (-2.49) (-2.68) (-3.43) (-1.71) (-3.04) (-1.48)
Security 19.386*** 36.775** 19.139*** 29.081* 32.280*** 103.163 25.337** 90.289
(2.97) (2.04) (3.05) (1.82) (2.87) (1.53) (2.40) (1.46)
PSD -8.651** -7.543 -8.272* -7.567* -7.066 -7.427 -5.896 -5.693
(-2.06) (-1.53) (-1.96) (-1.68) (-1.17) (-0.47) (-0.99) (-0.39)
Crisis - -38.094** - -67.588
- (-1.98) - (-0.82)
Sprd_Crisis 0.122** 0.138*** 0.266*** 0.336***
(2.12) (4.04) (2.73) (2.77)
logAmount 4.181*** 8.292** 3.950** 6.304* 11.790*** 17.571* 10.552*** 15.650*
(2.63) (2.06) (2.51) (1.78) (3.08) (1.95) (2.87) (1.89)
logMaturity -3.916 -2.544 -5.485 -4.796 -7.410 8.085 -10.069* 3.855
(-0.95) (-0.69) (-1.32) (-1.44) (-1.27) (0.46) (-1.73) (0.24)
Refinance -8.824 -14.103* -8.805 -11.866* -2.987 -24.254 -2.513 -21.973
(-1.22) (-1.91) (-1.21) (-1.78) (-0.34) (-0.89) (-0.29) (-0.87)
Amendment 0.273 0.252 0.330 0.414 2.452 13.979 0.808 11.987
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.35) (0.70) (0.11) (0.64)
logAssets -7.717** -11.376 -6.643* -9.896
(-2.21) (-1.33) (-1.86) (-1.25)
Leverage -2.144 -3.351 1.376 -0.061
(-0.16) (-0.11) (0.11) (-0.00)
Q -2.313 -3.803 -2.679 -3.980
(-1.22) (-0.68) (-1.38) (-0.77)
Profitability -19.951 -388.945 -40.757 -378.841
(-0.29) (-1.09) (-0.57) (-1.15)
Tangibility -11.874 -57.468 -14.634 -56.922
(-0.55) (-0.96) (-0.74) (-1.02)
CashFlowRisk -72.169 -633.989 -45.550 -556.763
(-0.44) (-1.03) (-0.25) (-0.99)
ZScore 0.393 0.823 0.476 0.841
(0.96) (0.43) (1.03) (0.48)
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1975 8774 1975 8774 874 3780 874 3780
adj. R2 0.2760 0.2840 0.2918 0.3270
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